Briefly explain how the concept of rational ignorance explains the tendency many people have not to learn about political candidates
What will be an ideal response?
For many people, the costs of becoming politically informed are high, whereas the benefits are low. As a result, they limit their quest for political information to listening to the radio on the way to work, talking with friends, casual reading, and other things they would normally do anyway. Even though most people in society might be better off if everyone became more informed, it isn’t worth the cost for most individuals to make the requisite effort to become informed themselves. Public choice economists refer to this lack of incentive to become informed as rational ignorance. People will generally make much more informed decisions as buyers than as voters. For example, you are likely to gather more information when making a decision on a car purchase than when you are deciding between candidates in an upcoming election. An uninformed decision on a car purchase will most likely affect your life much more than an uninformed decision on a candidate, especially when your vote will most likely not alter the outcome of the election. Because you cannot disbundle, you are voting for a candidate who takes a stand on many issues—that is, you are voting on a bundle of issues that are difficult to assess.
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Suppose that in a given country in a given year, GNP equals $2,000, investment expenditures equal $200, government expenditures equal $150, and the current account surplus equals $50. Consumption expenditures therefore equal
A) $1,000. B) $1,200. C) $1,400. D) $1,600.
Decreasing returns to scale may occur because increasing the amount of inputs used
A) increases specialization. B) always increases the amount of output produced. C) may cause coordination difficulties. D) increases efficiency.