Markets and Ocean Fisheries
Read: "The Common Pathologies of Overfishing" by John A. Baden and Douglas S. Noonan.
Questions:
- In the absence of government regulation, do individuals possess property rights to fish in the ocean?
- Why are many ocean fisheries experiencing significant declines in the harvest of fish? Is this problem related to the existence of property rights?
- Why would a quota on the total catch in a fishery or shortened fishing seasons lead to too much investment in capital and an inefficient use of resources?
- Would the use of individual transferable permits result in a more efficient outcome? Explain.
- No individuals possess property rights to fish in the ocean.
- The significant declines in fish harvests are the result of increasing demand for fish, more effective technologies for catching fish, and the absence of property rights. Each individual receives all of the benefits from catching additional fish, but the cost of a depleted breeding stock is shared by all participants in the fishery.
- If there is a quota on the total catch in a fishery or a shortened season, each individual fisherman has an incentive to catch as many fish as possible in a very limited time. This encourages excessive investment in boats, nets, etc. The same total number of fish would be caught over a longer period of time at a lower cost per fish if neither of these restrictions were in place.
- With individual transferable permits, each fisherman would be able to catch a particular quantity of fish, no matter how long they spend fishing. This would provide for more effective control over the total harvest than under a fishing season of limited duration and would also provide no incentive to invest in too much capital. The sale of fishing permits would result in the most fishing being done by those who have the lowest cost of fishing.
- No individuals possess property rights to fish in the ocean.
- The significant declines in fish harvests are the result of increasing demand for fish, more effective technologies for catching fish, and the absence of property rights. Each individual receives all of the benefits from catching additional fish, but the cost of a depleted breeding stock is shared by all participants in the fishery.
- If there is a quota on the total catch in a fishery or a shortened season, each individual fisherman has an incentive to catch as many fish as possible in a very limited time. This encourages excessive investment in boats, nets, etc. The same total number of fish would be caught over a longer period of time at a lower cost per fish if neither of these restrictions were in place.
- With individual transferable permits, each fisherman would be able to catch a particular quantity of fish, no matter how long they spend fishing. This would provide for more effective control over the total harvest than under a fishing season of limited duration and would also provide no incentive to invest in too much capital. The sale of fishing permits would result in the most fishing being done by those who have the lowest cost of fishing.
Economics
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Sharon purchases two products with a given fixed budget, orange juice and soda. Her marginal utility from orange juice is 60 and her marginal utility from soda is 30. The price of a bottle of orange juice is $2.00 and the price of soda is $1.00. These data suggest that:
A. Sharon is maximizing her utility from the given fixed budget B. Sharon should buy more orange juice and less soda C. Sharon should buy more soda and less orange juice D. Sharon should buy less orange juice and soda
Economics