Consider a market with (inverse) demand p = 100 - 2Q. There are two firms in the market with constant marginal and average costs of $10
a. Determine the Cournot equilibrium quantities and price
b. What would be the collusive (joint-profit maximizing) price and quantity?
c. Derive the deadweight loss from (i) Cournot Dupoly, (ii) Collusion, and (iii) Perfect competition in this market with the two firms.
a. q1 = q2 = 15
p = 100 - 2(30 ) = 40
b. 100 - 4Q = 10 Q = 22.5, q = 11.25
p = 55
c. DWL from P.C. = 0
DWL from monopoly = .5(45 - 22.5 )(55 – 10 ) = 506.25
DWL from duopoly = .5(45 – 30 )(40 – 10 ) = 225
You might also like to view...
Refer to Scenario 14.1. Marco and Lisette decide to help each other out and agree to split any medical bills from their doctor. With this new arrangement, this scenario resembles a
A) chicken game. B) assurance game. C) battle of the sexes game. D) prisoner's dilemma game.
The more sensitive quantity demanded is to a change in price, the
A) smaller a change in price must be to induce a certain change in quantity demanded. B) greater the absolute price elasticity of demand. C) smaller the absolute price elasticity of demand. D) closer the absolute price elasticity of demand is to zero.