If information is asymmetric, explain why the hire contract is not efficient in production and a moral hazard exists, but the fixed fee to the principal contract is efficient and does not pose a moral hazard problem
What will be an ideal response?
With the hire contract, the agent has no incentive to behave in such a manner as to maximize the joint profit of the agent and the principal. The contract provides no incentive for the agent to behave optimally, and the contract does nothing to prevent moral hazard. The agent can usually increase his value of the contract by committing a moral hazard. The fixed fee to the principal contract gives the agent all the profit after the fee to the principal is paid. This provides an incentive for the agent to behave optimally and maximize the profit of the firm. The agent's desire to behave optimally prevents moral hazard.
You might also like to view...
"Because apples and oranges are substitutes, an increase in the price of oranges will cause the demand for apples to increase
This initial shift in demand for apples results in a higher price for apples; this higher price will cause the demand curve for apples to shift to the right." Which of the following correctly comments on this statement? A) The statement is false because oranges are inferior goods; apples are normal goods. B) The statement is false because one cannot assume that apples and oranges are substitutes for all consumers. C) The statement will be true if consumer tastes for apples and oranges do not change. D) The statement is false because a change in the price of apples would not change the demand for apples.
Refer to the information provided in Table 31.2 below to answer the question(s) that follow.Table 31.2PeriodQuantity of Labor (L)Quantity of Capital (K)Total Output (Y)1 50 50 2002 50 60 2153 50 70 2254 50 80 230Refer to Table 31.2. During Period 4, output per capital is equal to
A. 0.35. B. 1.77. C. 2.88. D. 4.6.