Suppose duopolists face the market inverse demand curve P = 100 - Q, Q = q1 + q2, and both firms have a constant marginal cost of 10 and no fixed costs. If firm 1 is a Stackelberg leader and firm 2's best response function is q2 = (100 - q1)/2, at the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium firm 1's profit is

A) 400.
B) 650.
C) 800.
D) 1200.

D

Economics

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On the horizontal axis of a graph, generally

A) values increase from left to right. B) values increase from right to left. C) values can be positive and/or negative. D) Both answers A and C are correct.

Economics

Refer to Figure 2-13. What is the opportunity cost of producing 1 ton of coconuts in Costa Rica?

A) 3/8 of a ton of pineapples B) 2/3 of a ton of pineapples C) 1 1/2 tons of pineapples D) 100 tons of pineapples

Economics