In 2005, Iraq had a per capita gross domestic productof US$3,400 and derived 95% of its foreign exchange earnings from oil. The literacy rate was 40.4% compared with a global average of 82%. It has three main ethnic groups Shia Muslim (56% of the population), Sunni Muslim (28%) and Kurds (15%), which amounts to 3.1 effective ethnic groups.

Which of these factors might contribute to the emergence and survival of democracy, which ones might hinder the emergence and survival of democracy, and which do you think are irrelevant for the emergence and survival of democracy?

Finally, if you were compelled to design a constitution for Iraq that maximized the probability of democratic consolidation, which institutions would you choose? For example, would you recommend a presidential or a parliamentary regime? What electoral system would you suggest? Please indicate the reasoning (logic and evidence) behind your answer.

What will be an ideal response?

Part A
• Iraq’s level of income is low. Przeworski and Limongi suggest that countries above US$6,055 that experience democracy are likely to stay democracies forever. Clark argues that increased wealth is also associated with the emergence of democracy. Either way, there is nothing about Iraq’s level of wealth that would encourage the emergence or survival of democracy.
• There is considerable evidence that reliance on mineral extraction, in general, and oil extraction to be specific, discourages the emergence and survival of democracy. In addition, because oil is a highly capital intense industry, owners of such assets are not likely to possess credible exit threats. Consequently, the presence of such actors is not expected to encourage the kind of government—elite bargaining likely to lead to limited government in general, or democracy specifically.
• Iraq’s social structure contains a fair degree of ethnic/religious diversity that some have argued is bad for the emergence and survival of democracy. Chandra argues, however, that it is not ethnic diversity per se, but the existence of a “permanent minority” that is problematic for democracy (because the permanent majority might rule in such a way that leaves that group grieved and likely to view governing institutions as illegitimate). Alas, because the Shia are a majority, there is a good chance that most democratic electoral systems would make them a permanent majority and the Sunni and Kurdish minorities would have incentives to support extra-constitutional attempts to overthrow the government.

Part B

• Although the prospects for democratic survival in Iraq are grim, the choice of institutions could, at the margin, make a big difference.
• One might argue that a strong chief executive in the form of a president that is elected by all Iraq might be necessary to create national unity, but if one did, it would be important to try to ensure that the president did not confront a highly fractionalized legislature. One way to do this is to try to encourage the formation of a two-party system. We know from Duverger’s law, that single-member district plurality(SMDP) will encourage the formation of a two-party system and, given a sufficient degree of ethnic fractionalization, large district magnitude PR will encourage the formation of a multiparty system.
• Thus, although there may be good reasons to adopt PR (suppose you wanted to encourage the formation of an ambitious welfare state), Ifyou chose presidentialism, choose an SMPD electoral system could be crucial for the survival of democracy in Iraq.
• A good answer would also include a discussion of federalism, whether and what kind ought to be adopted.