Suppose a player in a game has a dominant strategy, but they threaten to take another action. Can this threat be credible?
A) No, such threats are never credible to other rational players.
B) No, if the player has a dominant strategy, they must take this action.
C) Yes, if they can link the current game to another bargaining problem in which their joint strategy for the combined games is rational.
D) Yes, dominant strategies may not always yield the highest payoffs.
C
Economics
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Other things the same, if the exchange rate changes from 6 Chinese yuan per dollar to 7 Chinese yuan per dollar, then the dollar
a. appreciates and buys more Chinese goods. b. appreciates and buys fewer Chinese goods. c. depreciates and buys more Chinese goods. d. depreciates and buys fewer Chinese goods.
Economics
The unionization rate of private sector workers is about:
A. 6.5%. B. 12.5%. C. 35.5%. D. 37.7%.
Economics