Let E= 0.50. Write the payoffs for both actors in the game below. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium?Please answer in the form (citizen’s 1st choice, citizen’s 2ndchoice; state’s choice).
Above is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state (S) and the citizen (C).E is what the citizen gets from her exit option. R is what the state gets from the support (revenue) of the citizen. 0 is what the citizen gets for remaining loyal to the state. c is the cost for the citizen of exercising her voice option.
For the question, let R =2.Let c = 0.25.
What will be an ideal response?
Demand limits, Disinvest; Accept limits
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The term "glasnost" used by Mikhail Gorbachev referred to:
A. restructuring B. openness C. freedom D. repression
Greater unionization of teachers is concerning for which of the following reasons?
A. Testing teacher competency has a negative impact on recruiting good teachers into the classroom. B. The image of teachers on strike further erodes the public image of education. C. It does not pose problems for administrators in the day-to-day management of schools. D. It causes greater disparity in the quality of education available to children in different geographic regions.