Why is the equilibrium in a trust game socially inefficient?
What will be an ideal response?
In a trust game, the first mover has to decide whether or not to trust the second mover. If he chooses to trust, the second mover can either cooperate or defect. If he cooperates, both the players will earn a higher payoff than they would have if the first player chose not to trust. If the second player defects, he will earn a higher payoff than the first player. Therefore, the second mover always has an incentive to defect. Given that the second mover is likely to defect, the first mover chooses not to trust. This results in a socially inefficient equilibrium because both the players can improve their payoffs by changing their respective strategies.
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Medical research that results in a cure for a serious disease produces positive externalities. What is the impact of this positive externality on economic efficiency?
A) At equilibrium, less than the economically efficient quantity of medical research is produced. B) At equilibrium, more than the economically efficient quantity of medical research is produced. C) A deadweight loss occurs because at equilibrium the marginal social cost of medical research is greater than the marginal social benefit. D) A deadweight loss occurs because at equilibrium the marginal social cost equals the marginal social benefit.
Other things equal, the supply of labor will be greater to a job that
a. requires advanced education and training b. requires most working hours be on weekends c. requires hard physical labor d. allows the employee greater discretion in the use of time e. has a higher probability of injury or death