Refer to Scenario 17.3. Moral hazard arises in this situation because once the firm
A) pays the premium that is based on the 0.001 probability, it has no incentive to spend the additional $80 for the fire protection program, so the true probability of loss is no longer 0.001.
B) pays the premium that is based on the 0.01 probability, it has no incentive to spend the additional $80 for the fire protection program, so the true probability of loss is no longer 0.01.
C) puts the fire protection program in place, it has less incentive to spend $300 for a premium, leaving the firm underinsured.
D) puts the fire protection program in place, it has less incentive to spend $6,000 for a premium, leaving the firm underinsured.
E) puts the fire protection program in place, it will consider that a substitute for insurance and not be able to deal with the loss from a fire should it occur.
A
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Skeeter's Skeeball Castle has seen its business slow down ever since Kerrie's Off-Key Karaoke opened up next door. Since the opening of Kerrie's Off-Key Karaoke, the opportunity cost of playing skeeball at Skeeter's has
A) decreased. B) not changed. C) fallen to zero. D) increased.
During recent Global Economic Crises, consumers' real wealth in the U.S. declined as a result of
A) the stock market crash, pricking of the housing bubble, and the increased household borrowing. B) the expansionary fiscal policy, and the expansionary monetary policy. C) the lack of fiscal and monetary policy coordination. D) the banks' decision not to issue additional loans.