Explain how not knowing whether someone will vote naively or strategically could make vote manipulation through agenda setting more difficult
What will be an ideal response?
If everyone's preferences are known and the people vote naively, an agenda setter knows exactly what the results of the vote will be. Knowing this, the agenda setter can possibly manipulate the election by setting the order of events to be voted on, assuming the election is sensitive to the order of events. If everyone's preferences are known but some or all people vote strategically, the agenda setter will not know with certainty what the results of the election will be. Being uncertain about the potential results makes it more difficult to manipulate the election by setting the order of events to be voted on.
You might also like to view...
Suppose an economist stated that Brazil had achieved its potential GDP 2013. This would imply that at this level of real GDP, Brazil experienced
A) peak in its business cycle in 2013. B) unemployment equal to zero. C) inflation equal to zero. D) full employment. E) a negative Okun Ga
Which group of policies aims at discouraging rivals from starting a price war?
A. Peak-peak pricing, two-part pricing, and price matching B. Price matching and randomized pricing C. Price matching, brand loyalty, and commodity bundling D. Randomized pricing, price discrimination, and cross-subsidization